We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never selects the same outcome in two distinct states), we show that it is also su¢ cient under a mild "no worst alternative"condition.
Introduction
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. We say that a social choice function f is rationalizably implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every rationalizable strategy pro…le leads to the realization of the social choice function f . A priori, implementation in rationalizable strategies does not require the existence of a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium that leads to the realization of f , and hence this implementation notion is neither stronger nor weaker than that of Nash implementation. However, we establish that a strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is necessary under the more stringent solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never picks the same outcome in two distinct states), we show that it is also su¢ cient under a "no worst alternative" (NWA) condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.
We are able to obtain this strong result because -like much of the classical implementation literature -we allow in…nite mechanisms (including "integer games"); and -unlike the classical implementation literature -we allow for stochastic mechanisms.
In earlier work (Bergemann and Morris (2008) , (2009)), two of us established necessary and su¢ cient conditions for "robust implementation" in incomplete information environments. There we showed that a social choice function f can be Bayesian equilibrium implemented for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs if and only if f is implementable under an incomplete information version of rationalizability. The results here are obtained by re…ning and further developing the rationalizability arguments for the complete information environment. We can establish stronger necessary and su¢ cient conditions than in the incomplete information environment. We can also dispense with an economic condition on the environment. In turn, we establish necessary conditions and su¢ cient conditions almost equivalent to Nash equilibrium implementation when the social choice function is responsive. The augmented mechanism which establishes the su¢ ciency result permits each agent to propose a menu of allocations. This construction already appeared in Maskin (1999) and Maskin and Sjostrom (2004) to establish complete information implementation in the presence of mixed strategies. The su¢ ciency arguments for Nash equilibrium implementation typically rely on a no-veto property of the social choice function. In contrast, we use a weak condition, introduced as "no worst alternative" by Cabrales and Serrano (2008) , to establish the su¢ ciency argument. This condition requires that in state and for every agent i, the social choice f ( ) is not the worst alternative among all possible allocations. The no worst alternative property plays a role in our proof that is quite distinct from the no veto property in the classic Nash equilibrium results. The no worst alternative property guarantees that in the augmented mechanism, any report in state in which an agent expresses his disagreement with the remaining agents cannot be a rationalizable report. By contrast, the no veto property guaranteed that if an agent were to express his disagreement, then further disagreement by other agents would only be possible in equilibrium if it would lead to the same equilibrium allocation as prescribed by f ( ).
These results narrow an open question in the literature. The existing literature shows that Maskin monotonicity is necessary for Nash implementation in any mechanism (even if stochastic mechanisms are allowed 1 ). Abreu and Matsushima (1992) shows that if implementation is made easier by (i) requiring only virtual implementation; and (ii) imposing a weak domain restriction ruling out identical preferences; then implementation is always possible even if it is made harder by (iii) requiring …nite mechanisms; and (iv) requiring the stronger solution concept of rationalizability.
Our result shows that it is possible to exactly implement a social choice function, in rationalizable strategies, even if domain restriction (ii) fails, as long as in…nite, stochastic, mechanisms are allowed.
Setup
The environment consists of a collection of I agents (we write I for the set of agents); a …nite set of possible states ; a countable set of pure allocations Z (we write Y (Z) for the set of lotteries on Z); and, to each state, we associate for each player i a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u i : Z ! R, extended to lotteries as u i : Y ! R with
Thus at two distinct states and 0 , all agents can have the same ordinal preferences; this contrasts with some of the literature that associates a state with a pro…le of ordinal preferences (e.g. Maskin
in Lipman (1994) . Let a message set pro…le S = (S 1 ; :::; S I ), where each S i 2 2 M i , and we write S for the collection of message set pro…les. The collection S is a lattice with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S S 0 if S i S 0 i for all i. The largest element is S = (M 1 ; :::; M I ). The smallest element is S = (?; ?; :::; ?).
We de…ne an operator b : S ! S to iteratively eliminate never best responses with b = b 1 ; :::b i ; :::; b I and b i is de…ned by:
We observe that b is increasing by de…nition: i.e.,
. By Tarski's …xed point theorem, there is a largest …xed point of b , which we label S M; . Thus (i) b S M; = S M;
, we say that message m i is rationalizable in (the complete information game parameterized by) state .
We can also construct the …xed point S M; by starting with S -the largest element of the lattice -and iteratively applying the operator b . If the message sets are …nite, we have
In this case, the solution concept is equivalent to iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (see Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) ). But if the mechanism M is in…nite, trans…nite induction may be necessary to reach the …xed point. 3 We will also sometimes use the following notation
again using trans…nite induction if necessary. Thus S M; i is the set of messages surviving (trans…nite) iterated deletion of never best responses. It is possible to show formally that S M; i is the set of messages that agent i might send consistent with common certainty of rationality and the fact that payo¤s are given by (Lipman (1994) ). Finally, we will say that a message set pro…le S = (S 1 ; :::; S I ) has the best response property in state if S b (S), or equivalently, if for each player i and message m i 2 S i ; there exists i 2 (M i ) such that i (m i ) > 0 ) m j 2 S j for each j 6 = i; and
3 Lipman (1994) contains a formal description of the trans…nite induction required. As he notes "we remove strategies which are never a best reply, taking limits where needed".
It is easy to check that if S has the best response property in state , then S S M; . Now a social choice function (SCF) f is given by f : ! Y . Mechanism M implements f in rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that, for all , S M; 6 = ? and m 2 S M; ) g (m) = f ( ). SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies if there exists M such that M implements f in rationalizable strategies. The de…nition of rationalizable implementation does not require the existence of a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium that leads the realization of the social choice function f . Hence, a priori, rationalizable implementation need not be stronger (neither weaker)
than Nash implementation. However, in the next Section, we provide necessary conditions and su¢ cient conditions for rationalizable implementation almost equivalent to Nash implementation.
Main Result
We …rst recall the de…nition of Maskin monotonicity restricted to social choice functions:
Social choice function f satis…es Maskin monotonicity if
0 for all i and y;
or, equivalently,
) and u i y; 0 > u i f ( ) ; 0 for some i and y.
The latter condition states that in case the desired alternative di¤ers at state and 0 , there must exist at least one agent who, if the true state were 0 and she expected other agents to claim the state is , could be o¤ered a reward y that would give her a strict incentive to "report" the deviation of other agents, where the reward y would not tempt her if the true state was in fact i.e. she would have a (weak) incentive to "report truthfully". The strengthening of Maskin monotonicity we will use, reinforces the latter statement, requiring that the reward y gives a strict incentive to "report truthfully" if the true state were .
De…nition 2 (Strict Maskin Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satis…es strict Maskin monotonicity if
Maskin monotonicity, which is necessary for Nash implementation, is weaker than strict Maskin monotonicity. We show in the following proposition that strict Maskin monotonicity (and hence Maskin monotonicity) is necessary for rationalizable implementation.
Proposition 1 (Necessary Conditions)
If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies, then f satis…es strict Maskin monotonicity.
Proposition 1 is a consequence of the following Lemma. In words, it states that, given a social choice function f , if and 0 satisfy condition (1) in the de…nition of strict Maskin monotonicity and, in addition, f is implementable by a mechanism M, then the set of rationalizable message pro…les must be the same in state and 0 .
Lemma 1

Pick and
; g implements f in rationalizable strategies, then we have S M; = S M; 0 .
Proof. Pick and 0 satisfying condition (1) and …x any mechanism M = (M i )
; g that implements f in rationalizable strategies.
It is clear that Proposition 1 is obtained as a corollary of Lemma 1. Oury and Tercieux (2009) have shown that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for "continuous" partial implementation of a social choice function, where "continuous" means that the direct mechanism itself must work for types that are close to the complete information types in the product topology. They also show that full implementation in rationalizable strategies is necessary. Hence, an alternative way to prove the necessity of Maskin monotonicity would be to use this latter result and Proposition 1.
We need two extra conditions for the su¢ ciency result.
The notion of responsiveness requires that the social choice function "responds"to a change in the state with a change in the social allocation.
De…nition 4 (No Worst Alternative)
Social choice function f satis…es "no worst alternative" (NWA) if, for each i and , there exists
Property NWA requires that an agent never gets his worst outcome under the social choice function. The NWA property appears in Cabrales and Serrano (2008) as a su¢ cient condition to guarantee implementation in best-response dynamics. Given the set of allocations fy i ( )g 2 , we de…ne the average allocation y i of this set by setting
Note that under NWA, for all and all i, there exists y i ( ) such that
this can be established by de…ning y i ( ) as follows:
We also de…ne the average allocation y of the set fy i g i2I by setting
Here again, we note that under NWA, for all and all i, there exists y i ( ) such that
where the above inequality clearly holds after de…ning y i ( ) as follows:
We now construct an auxiliary set of allocations, denoted by fz i ; 0 g ; 0 , which uses the existence of the allocations fy i ( )g 2 . The allocations fz i ; 0 g ; 0 are going to appear in the canonical mechanism to be de…ned shortly where they guarantee the existence of better response for agent i should the remaining agents choose to misreport the true state. In particular, the following Lemma establishes that for agent i the allocation z i ; 0 represents an improvement if the true state is but the other agents misreport it to be 0 . It also establishes that z i ; 0 would not constitute an improvement relative to f 0 if the true state were indeed 0 .
Lemma 2
If social choice function f satis…es "no worst alternative" (NWA) then for each player i, there exists a collection of lotteries z i ;
0 such that for all ; 0 :
and for 6 = 0 :
Proof. Based on the allocations fy i ( )g 2 from De…nition 4, we de…ne our collection of lotteries as follows. First, for all 0 :
with y i as de…ned in (9), and for all ; 0 with 6 = 0 :
By NWA and the …niteness of the state space , we can …nd a su¢ ciently small, but positive, " > 0 such that for all and 0 : u i f 0 ; 0 > u i z i ; 0 ; 0 which establishes inequality (12). Now we observe that the only di¤erence between z i 0 ; 0 and z i ; 0 is the fact that the lottery y i ( ) is replaced by the lottery f ( ). But now by NWA, this is clearly increasing the expected utility of agent i in state , and hence we have for all ; 0 with 6 = 0 :
which establishes the strict inequality (13).
We establish the su¢ cient conditions for implementation in rationalizable strategies by means of a canonical mechanism. The canonical mechanism shares many basic features with the implementation mechanism suggested by Maskin and Sjostrom (2004) to establish complete information implementation in the presence of mixed strategies, and is a modi…cation of the original mechanism suggested by Maskin (1999) . The aforementioned allocations z i ;
0 appear in the mechanism if agent i reports a state di¤erent from the reported state 0 by all the other agents. In this case, the allocation z i 0 ; 0 is chosen with positive probability, yet this probability can be lowered by a suitable message of agent i and be replaced by a more favorable allocation z i ; 0 .
In the Proposition below, we show that Maskin monotonicity together with NWA are su¢ cient for rationalizable implementation. The fact that we do not refer to strict Maskin monotonicity in this statement may seem surprising given that in Proposition 1 we showed that strict Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation. This is due to the simple fact that under NWA, strict Maskin monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent. 4
Proposition 2 (Su¢ cient Conditions)
If I 3, f is responsive, satis…es Maskin monotonicity and NWA, then f is implementable in rationalizable strategies.
Proof. We establish the result by constructing an implementing mechanism M = (M; g).
First, recall that by de…nition of Maskin monotonicity, for all and
there exist i and y( ;
We de…ne the following …nite set of lotteries:
where the collection z i ;
0 has been de…ned in Lemma 2 while the collection fy i ( )g i; has been established in (11). 4 To see this just note that if f is Maskin monotonic then f ( ) 6 = f ( 0 ) implies the existence of some i and
and ui (y;
Each agent i sends a message
The third component of the message pro…le will allow agent i to suggest an allocation m 3 i ( ) contingent on all the other agents j 6 = i reporting m 1 j = . The outcome function will make use of the "uniformly worse outcome" de…ned earlier by y. Now the outcome g (m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule 1: If m 1 i = and m 2 i = 1 for all i, pick f ( ). Rule 2: If there exists i 2 I -called the deviating player -such that m 1 j ; m 2 j = ( ; 1) for all j 6 = i and m 1 i ; m 2 i 6 = ( ; 1), then we go to two subrules:
, pick m 3 i ( ) with probability 1 1=(m 2 i + 1) and z i ( ; ) with probability 1=(m 2 i + 1);
, pick z i ( ; ) with probability 1. Rule 3: In all other cases, we identify a pivotal agent i by requiring that m 2 i m 2 j for all j 2 I and that if for j 6 = i; m 2 i = m 2 j , then i < j. The rule then requires that with probability 1 1=(m 2 i + 1) we pick m 4 i , and with probability 1=(m 2 i + 1) we pick y. Claim 1. It is never a best reply for agent i to send a message with m 2 i > 1 (i.e., m i 2 b i S ) m 2 i = 1). Proof of Claim 1. We proceed by contradiction and suppose that
and m 2 i > 1. Then for any pro…le of messages m i that player i's opponents may play, (m i ; m i ) will trigger either Rule 2 or Rule 3. But in this case, whatever agent i's beliefs i 2 (M i ) about the other agents' messages, his payo¤ can be increased by modifying m i appropriately, in particular by increasing the integer choice from m 2 i . To see this, denote the set of messages of all agents excluding i in which Rule 2 is triggered by:
and the set of messages of all agents excluding i in which Rule 3 is triggered as the complement set:
Suppose …rst that agent i has a belief i 2 (M i ) under which Rule 3 is triggered with positive probability, so that i M 3 i > 0. Note that if agent i plays m i ; with strictly positive probability y is provided. Hence, because from (11), y i ( ) 2 Y is such that u i (y i ( ); ) > u i (y; ), i's expected utility conditional on Rule 3 satis…es:
, it is easily checked that i's expected utility conditional on Rule 3 tends to X
as b m 2 i tends to in…nity. Thus, player i can always improve his expected payo¤ conditional on Rule 3 by deviating from m i to b m i and announcing b m 2 i large enough. Now suppose that agent i believes that Rule 2 will be triggered with positive probability, so
and observe that the choice of b m 4 i does not a¤ect the outcome of the mechanism conditional on Rule 2. We also note that for any m i 2 M 2 i such that i (m i ) > 0, (m i ; m i ) does not trigger Rule 2(ii). Indeed, if it were the case, we would have
We have to distinguish two cases: whether players j 6 = i send message or not. First, consider the case where
, and so by construction of the mechanism, ( b m i ; m i ) now triggers Rule 2(i). Again using Lemma 2 and the fact that m 1 i 6 = , we get
Hence, the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which yields the contradiction.
Consider the second case where 
the expected utility of player i would strictly increase, which here again yields a contradiction. So now we know that for any
. Using a similar reasoning, it is easily shown that for any i (m i ) = 0, then Rule 2 or 3 will be triggered with probability one. Although, Rule 2 can now be triggered with a "deviating player" being di¤erent of i, it is easily checked that a similar argument as in Claim 1 applies and so the message m i cannot be a best reply by agent i. Suppose now that the belief i of agent i is such that:
While we still argue that agent i can strictly increase his expected utility by selecting an integer b m 2 i > 1, we observe that a complication arises as with i given by (16), a choice of b m 2 i > 1 leads from an allocation determined by Rule 1 to an allocation determined by Rule 2, and hence the realization of an unfavorable allocation y with positive probability. But now we observe that by selecting b m i such that: 
), i's expected payo¤ from playing m i is strictly lower than we know that player j's belief against which m j = 0 ; 1; m 3 j ; m 4 j is a best reply assigns probability one to each player l 6 = j sending a message of the form m l = 0 ; 1; m 3 l ; m 4 l . Hence, player j's expected payo¤ from playing m j is u j (f ( 0 ); ); while if j deviates tom j = 0 ;m 2 j ;m 3 j ; m 4 j ; wherê
player j believes with probability one that Rule 2(i) will be triggered. Hence, player j's expected payo¤ would be
Note that asm 2 j tends to in…nity, this expression tends to u j (y( 0 ; ); ) which is strictly larger than u j f 0 ; . Hence form 2 j large enough,m j is better response for player j than 0 ; 1; m 3 j ; m 4 j , a contradiction. Thus f 0 = f ( ). Since the social choice function has been assumed to be responsive, we get 0 = as claimed.
Completion of proof. Claims 1, 2 and 3 together imply that for each : S The mechanism M used here allows each agent to propose a menu of choices m 3 i = m 3 i ( ) 2 . The menu m 3 i gives agent i the opportunity to select an appropriate allocation in case that Rule 2 is triggered. In our su¢ ciency argument, the NWA property replaces the no veto property which commonly appears in the su¢ ciency argument for implementation in Nash equilibrium. Yet, in terms of the proof, the role of the NWA property is quite distinct from the no veto property. The NWA property guarantees that in the augmented mechanism, any report in state in which an agent expresses his disagreement with the remaining agents (i.e. m 2 i > 1) cannot be a rationalizable report. By contrast, the no veto property guaranteed that if an agent were to express his disagreement, then further disagreement by other agents would only be possible in equilibrium if it would lead to the same equilibrium allocation as prescribed f ( ).
We note that our mechanism not only implements in rationalizable messages but also implements in Nash equilibrium (the proof of Claim 2 above indeed establishes the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium at each state). In recent work, Bochet (2007) and Benoit and Ok (2008) report su¢ cient conditions for implementation in Nash equilibrium strategies using stochastic mechanisms. Their conditions, the top strict di¤ erence condition and the top coincidence condition, respectively, do not imply nor are they implied by the NWA property required for su¢ ciency. In related work, Serrano and Vohra (2007) have used stochastic implementing mechanisms to provide weak su¢ cient conditions for Bayesian implementation in mixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium.
The Non-Responsive Case
In this section, we discuss extensions of our results to the cases when the social choice function is not responsive. We will provide a strengthening of strict Maskin monotonicity that can be shown to be su¢ cient (together with a strengthening of the NWA) even if the social choice function is not responsive. We also show that the strengthening of strict Maskin monotonicity is actually necessary for rationalizable implementation given a weak condition on the class of mechanisms to be considered. This weak condition is trivially satis…ed when the social choice function is responsive. Now, given a social choice function f , let us consider the unique partition of :
We now introduce the following notion which reduces to strict Maskin monotonicity in case f is responsive.
De…nition 5 (Strict Maskin Monotonicity )
Social choice function f satis…es strict Maskin monotonicity if there exists a partition P of …ner than P f s.t. for any :
1. 0 2 P( ) whenever for all i and y
or, equivalently, 2. 0 = 2 P( ) implies for some i and y
Before we establish the necessary and su¢ cient conditions, we brie ‡y describe the complications that arise with a non-responsive social choice function. By de…nition, under a non-responsive social choice function there are at least two states, and 0 , that lead to the same social choice:
f ( ) = f 0 = z. Now, a priori, the principal would not need to know whether it is the state or 0 which leads to the realization of the social choice z. In fact, it would appear that it would be su¢ cient to learn that the realized state belongs to the set z of states which lead to the social choice z. Now, such a coarse reporting protocol as suggested by the above partition P f would be su¢ cient if the agents were known to report truthfully, yet a problem arises if they might not report truthfully. For, if an agent now alleges collusive behavior of the remaining agents, the principal may lack the information to verify whether the whistle-blower himself is behaving in an incentive compatible manner. After all, the principal would merely know that the reported state is in some set z but would not know the identity of the state itself. Thus, while it might not be useful to distinguish between any two states ; 0 2 z if the agents were to report truthfully, it might be critical to distinguish between and 0 in order to fend o¤ undesirable equilibrium play by the agents. This discussion might therefore suggest that the inequalities (18), or alternatively (19), should be satis…ed for the …nest possible partition of states. But, as we argue next, such a condition would (i) require too much to constitute a necessary condition, and (ii) be impossible to satisfy by any implementing mechanism.
The …rst observation is straightforward to establish. Consider for the moment the strict Maskin monotonicity condition in the version of (19), which we might refer to as the whistle-blower inequality. Now suppose that the social choice problem is such that the inequalities (19) are satis…ed even for the coarse partition P f itself. In this case, we would …nd that the principal would not need to distinguish between any two states ; 0 2 z , either for truthtelling or, by condition (19), for whistle-blowing behavior.
The second observation stems from an earlier result. Lemma 1 gave a su¢ cient condition under which the set of rationalizable actions for any pair of states, and 0 , have to be identical for all agents. For the purpose here we can restrict attention to any two states with ; 0 2 z . In this case, the condition (1) reads as follows:
0 for all i and y.
In words, if for every agent i, the upper contour set (relative to the allocation f ( ) = f 0 = z), As we already stated, we can prove that strict Maskin monotonicity is necessary under a weak condition on the class of mechanisms we consider. This condition states that for any state and any rationalizable message m i of any player i in this state, the message m i is also best-response to some belief with support in the set of rationalizable actions of the other players and for any state b such that S M; b = S M; , best responses against this belief are non-empty.
De…nition 6 (Best Response Property)
Given a social choice function f , a mechanism M has the best-response property if for all and
, there exists Note that if f is responsive then any implementing mechanism must satisfy S M; b = S M; ) b = and so any implementing mechanism must have the best-response property. Moreover, the best-response property also holds for any pair ; 0 which are directly related through the inclusion property (1). The best-response property then secures that it applies also to pro…les which are indirectly related as in the example of ; 0 ; 00 2 z discussed above. Hence, the subsequent Proposition 3 generalizes Proposition 1 above.
Proposition 3 (Necessary Conditions)
If f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a mechanism M having the best-response property, then f satis…es strict Maskin monotonicity .
In order to show this, we prove the following Lemma that generalizes Lemma 1.
Lemma 3
Assume the existence of a mechanism M = (M i )
; g , that has the best-response property and that implements f in rationalizable strategies. Pick and 0 satisfying condition (18) where the partition P is assumed to be P( 00 ) = n~ 2 S M; 00 = S M;~ o for any 00 . We have S M; = S M; 0 .
Proof. Fix any mechanism M = (M i )
; g that has the best-response property and that implements f and pick and 0 satisfying condition (18) for P(
for all i and y h for all b 2 P( ) :
Note that by construction, b 2 P( ) ) S M; b = S M; . In addition, since M implements f in rationalizable strategies, for any state in P( 00 ), f picks the outcome f ( 00 ) and so P is …ner than
We …rst show that S M; S M; 0 . Because b S M; = S M; , S M; has the best response property in state i.e. for all player i and all m i 2 S
M; i
; there exists
for each j 6 = i; and
for all m 0 i 2 M i . In addition, since M has the best response property,
can be chosen so that:
for all b 2 P( ). This in turn implies that for all b 2 P( ) :
for all m 0 i 2 M i . To see this, observe that if it were not true, we would have for some b 2 P( ) :
where m i denotes a best response to , we have g(m i ; m i ) = f ( ). Thus,
. In addition, we claim that for all b 2 P( ) :
. Indeed, by (20), the above is true with a weak inequality. Now if an equality were to hold, some
would be a best response against
in some state b . Thus the set
would have the best response property in state
which is false by assumption.
Now, by assumption, we know that
for all i and y and so applying this to the lotteries y , X
. Finally, (21) and (23) ensure that m i is also a best response against
To complete the proof, we have to show that S M; S M; 0 . The argument is the same as in Lemma 1.
Note that if f is implementable by a mechanism M that has the best response property, then if one were to pick the partition P given by P( 00 ) = n~ 2 S M; 00 = S M;~ o for any 00 , then whenever and 0 satisfy condition (18), by Lemma 3, we must have S M; = S M; 0 and so, by de…nition, 0 2 P( ). Hence, Proposition 3 is obtained as a corollary of Lemma 3.
As mentioned earlier, it is easily checked that our su¢ ciency argument can be extended to this setting provided that a strengthening of NWA is used. To be more speci…c, if one assumes that f is (strict) Maskin monotonic and that for any state , there exists some outcome that is worse than the outcome selected by f at any state in the partition cell P( ), then we can build a mechanism similar to the one built in the proof of Proposition 2. 6 In the revised mechanism each player is asked to report a partition cell P in P, an integer, a mapping from P to Y and a lottery in Y.
Essentially, everything would go as if we were replacing each state by the partition cell containing . In particular, as in the responsive case, we can show that for any rationalizable message, using condition (19) in the de…nition of Maskin monotonicity , each agent will report truthfully, i.e., will report P( ) whenever the true state is and announce an integer equal to 1. The modi…ed notions of strict Maskin monotonicity and NWA as well as the su¢ ciency argument itself are presented in detail in the appendix.
Concluding Remarks
We conclude with a few observations. First, this paper focused on social choice functions, let us brie ‡y discuss the case of social choice correspondences. In Proposition 1 and 2 we reported results for social choice functions only. A social choice correspondence de…nes a set of permissible allocations and rationalizability is a set-based solution concept. Thus, there are a number of plausible extensions of the de…nition of rationalizable implementation to social choice correspondences. The extensions basically vary to the extent that one wishes to restrict attention to selections in the set of outcome pro…les. 7 We now show that Maskin monotonicity may not even be a necessary condition for implementation in rationalizable strategies (according to at least one natural de…ni-tion of these terms). 8 We describe The social choice correspondence is F ( ) = fa; b; c; dg and F ( ) = fdg. Now we demonstrate that F is not Maskin monotonic. To see why, note that a 2 F ( ) and that u i (a; ) u i (z; ) ) 7 The issue already appears in incomplete information implementation literature, where it is common to use a social choice set, a selection, rather than the social choice correspondence. 8 As shown in Mezzetti and Renou (2009) , a similar issue appears when one considers implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium where -contrary to the usual requirement -implementation does not ask for each alternative in the set of desired alternatives to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. and thus g[S M; ] = fdg = F ( ). We thus showed that F is implementable in rationalizable strategies, yet did not satisfy Maskin monotonicity.
Second, Proposition 1 exhibits a necessary condition for rationalizable implementation that is strictly stronger than the usual one for Nash implementation. Here we provide an example of a social choice function that is not rationalizable implementable but which is Nash-implementable.
There are 3 agents; = f ; g; Z = fa; b; c; dg; payo¤s are given by the following table: The social choice correspondence is f ( ) = a and f ( ) = b. It is easily checked that f is Maskin
but u 1 (f ( ) ; ) < u 1 (c; )) and satis…es no-veto-power. Hence, standard arguments (see Maskin (1999) and Maskin and Sjostrom (2004) ) show that f is implementable in (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium. However, for any player i and y 2 (Z) : u i (f ( ) ; ) u i (y; ) and so this social choice function cannot be strict Maskin monotonic, and so it is not implementable in rationalizable strategies.
Finally, from a purely game-theoretic point of view, the results presented in Proposition 1 and 2 may appear surprisingly strong. Given that we are investigating a social choice function, the notion of full implementation is akin to requiring that the game has a unique equilibrium (outcome). The present implementation results then say that -provided that the social choice function is responsive -a unique rationalizable outcome arises under (almost) the same conditions as a unique Nash equilibrium outcome. This is noteworthy as the necessary and almost su¢ cient condition of Maskin monotonicity is much weaker than the well-known conditions under which there are close connections between Nash equilibrium and rationalizability, such as supermodular or concave games. The Nash equilibrium results indicate the strength of the implementation approach to reduce the number of equilibria. The arguments presented here complement and extend these results. By using in…nite message spaces and stochastic allocations, we strengthen the positive implementation results to the weaker solution concept of rationalizability.
Appendix
In the appendix we provide a proof of our su¢ ciency result for the case that the social choice function is not responsive. Assume that f satis…es strict Maskin monotonicity with partition P.
We say that f satis…es the "no worst alternative ", not only when agents never get their worst outcome under the social choice function but if for any state , there is some outcome that is worst than the outcome selected by f at any state in the element P( ) of the partition P. In the sequel, we will write [ ] for P( ) and sometimes abuse notations writing f ([ ]) for f ( ).
De…nition 7
Social choice function f satis…es "no worst alternative " (NWA ) if, for each i and [ ], there exists
Given a set of allocations fy i ([ ])g 2 , it is useful to de…ne the average allocation y i of this set by setting
Note that under NWA , for all [ ] and all i, there exists a y i ([ ]) such that
for all^ 2 [ ], it is indeed easily checked that this is true for
It will also be useful to de…ne the average allocation y of the set fy i g i2I by setting
Here again, we note that under NWA , for all [ ] and all i, there exists a y (i; [ ]) such that 
and for [ ] 6 = [ 0 ] :
Proof. Based on the allocations fy i ([ ])g 2 , we de…ne our collection of lotteries as follows.
First, for all [ 0 ]:
with y i as de…ned in (24 We are now in a position to prove our su¢ ciency result.
Proposition 4 (Su¢ cient Conditions)
If I 3 and f satis…es strict Maskin monotonicity and NWA , then f is implementable in rationalizable strategies.
Proof. We establish the result by constructing an implementing mechanism M = (M; g). Note that asm 2 j tends to in…nity, this expression tends to u j (y([ 0 ]; ); ) which is strictly larger than u j f 0 ; . Hence form 2 j large enough,m j is better response for player j than 
